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OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
 Following two robberies that occurred on June 22 and 29, 2000, Alonzo Price was 
tried, convicted, and sentenced to a term of life in prison, plus thirty years.  At his trial, 
the sole piece of evidence squarely linking him to the robberies was a cigarette butt with 
his DNA on it.  The butt was allegedly recovered from one of the crime scenes.  
However, the chain of custody of this cigarette butt was poorly documented, raising the 
possibility that the butt with Price’s DNA on it did not come from the crime scene.  
Despite this irregularity, defense counsel never addressed the chain of custody at trial.  
Price has filed for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment because counsel failed to attack the chain 
of custody of the cigarette butt.  We conclude that counsel was ineffective and that Price 
was prejudiced thereby.  Thus, we will grant the writ. 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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I. Background 
A. Facts 
 The two robberies were conducted in a similar manner:  In each, the robber cut 
open a window screen to enter the victim’s home in the early hours of a Thursday 
morning, threatened the victim with a sharp object, climbed on top of her, bound her 
hands with torn strips of her bedding, and stole jewelry and cash before leaving.  The 
victims, Sadie Hamer and Mary Perez, gave fairly similar descriptions of the robber:  an 
African American male, roughly 5’9” and 175 pounds (or “medium build”), wearing a 
red shirt during the Hamer robbery and a gray shirt and denim shorts during the Perez 
robbery.1 Perez described his breath as smelling of cigarettes and possibly alcohol.2 
 Each victim called the police, and several officers, including Detective William 
Scull, responded.  Mary Perez told the officers that the voice of the robber sounded like 
Price,3 that it might be Price,4 and that the robber might have been trying to disguise his 
voice.5  She knew Price because he was a customer at the pharmacy where she worked 
part-time.6  However, she did not want to rule anyone out.7   
 Perez had told the robber that she had money in her purse in her car nearby.  It was 
when he left her apartment to find the purse that she called the police.  When officers 
                                                 
1 App. 209, 229, 242-43. 
2 App. 100. 
3 App. 179. 
4 App. 351 
5 App. 103. 
6 App. 119. 
7 Hamer also knew Price—they had known each other all their lives, App. 253—and she 
heard the robber’s voice, but she did not specifically identify Price as the robber. 
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searched Perez’s car, they found a pair of scissors that did not belong to her.  During the 
robbery, the robber had held something sharp against Perez’s neck.  Police suspected that 
the scissors may have been that sharp object.  None of the police officers who came to 
Perez’s apartment that night to investigate the robbery saw a cigarette butt on the roof 
outside the cut window screen.      
 Although the description of the robber did not match Price’s size and weight -- his 
height is 6’3” and at the time he weighed 225 pounds -- Scull and Detective Karl Ulbrich 
arrested Price at his place of work on the afternoon after the Perez robbery.8   
 On that evening, Perez returned briefly to her apartment with two friends, one of 
whom was Carmen Pierce.  Pierce noticed a filterless cigarette butt on the roof outside 
the window through which the robber had entered.  Pierce went out on the roof and 
picked up the butt, using a tissue.  Perez and Pierce contacted the police, and Scull came 
to collect the cigarette butt.  Accounts differ regarding what Scull did next with the 
cigarette butt, but he appears to have placed it into an envelope of some sort.9  He took no 
notes or photographs10 of the cigarette butt and did not log in the butt,11 even though he 
had recorded in a log the other items that he recovered from the scene.  The first written 
reference to the cigarette butt is a week later, when the evidence was sent to a lab for 
                                                 
8 They created an arrest warrant related to an old traffic matter, but the arrest warrant was 
invalid; it was not signed by a judicial officer. 
9 Perez testified that she saw Scull place the cigarette butt in a plastic bag, although Scull 
said that he placed the item in an envelope; Scull and Pierce both identified the envelope 
at trial.   
10 Four months later, he returned to take pictures that used a paint can lid to show where 
the butt was found, but the lid was placed inaccurately.  App. 140. 
11 App. 355. 
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testing.  The date on the lab paperwork is faded, but there is no dispute that it reads July 
6, 2000.12  Scull later wrote that he turned the envelope containing the cigarette butt over 
to Ulbrich.  However, although Ulbrich’s investigation report mentions every piece of 
evidence that he handled and notes that these items were secured in the police station’s 
temporary evidence locker, the report does not say the same of the cigarette butt.  
Ulbrich’s report states merely that “Scull took the item into evidence and obtained the 
information regarding it’s discovery and collection.” 13  He nowhere states that Scull gave 
the butt to him.   
 A few hours after collecting the cigarette butt, Scull and other officers executed a 
search warrant on Price’s room in the boarding house where he lived.  They found an 
ashtray full of filtered and unfiltered cigarette butts.14  Price claims that it was one of 
these butts that was substituted by the police for the butt found on the roof and that was 
then found to contain Price’s DNA.   
 As a result of the search, the officers seized a gray T-shirt and a pair of denim 
shorts.15  They did not find a red T-shirt or any of the missing jewelry or money. 
 Following the investigation, the one piece of tangible evidence that directly 
connected Price to the robberies was the cigarette butt.  Pierce was not able to verify at 
trial that it was the same butt that she had recovered from the roof; by the time of trial, 
                                                 
12 See 3d Cir. Dec. 20, 2016 Modified Record, p. 213; see also id. at 168; Appellant Br. 5. 
13 App. 355. 
14 App. 187. 
15 App. 188.  
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lab testing had shredded the butt.16  Scull did testify that it was the same butt.  The State 
lab tested the butt that was sent to the lab by the police and found that saliva on the butt 
contained DNA matching Price’s DNA.  This result placed Price outside the window to 
Perez’s apartment around the time of the robberies.17 
 The remaining evidence was mixed.  Price owned a pair of scissors similar to 
those found in Perez’s car,18 his landlady testified that she had seen Price in their shared 
bathroom cutting his hair with the scissors;19 but, when at trial, she saw the scissors found 
in Perez’s car, she said that Price’s scissors were larger;20 the gray T-shirt from Price’s 
room had red fibers on it, but those red fibers did not match anything from either victim’s 
residence;21 and the torn parts of the pillow shams, which the State initially had argued 
were held in the robber’s teeth while he tied up the victims,22 had saliva with DNA that 
did not match Price’s DNA.  Furthermore, none of the physical evidence from the Hamer 
crime scene was connected with Price, and the State later stipulated that human hair 
                                                 
16 App. 137.   
17 It had been lightly raining or misty the night of the Perez robbery and had been raining 
on previous nights so that it was unlikely that the butt would have remained in relatively 
good condition if it had been there for very long.  Scull testified that when he first saw 
the butt it was in relatively good condition.  App. 272.  Thus, if Price had left the butt on 
the roof, he had done so recently. 
18 App. 151-52.  
19 App. 153.  When the officers searched Price’s room, they did not search the bathroom.  
App. 296. 
20 Perez’s landlord, who had seen Price’s scissors, testified to this effect.  App. 160 
(“These look smaller.”); App. 161 (“To me I think [Price’s scissors] were bigger.”).  The 
search of Price’s room, did not turn up any scissors. 
21 App. 310-11. 
22 Dkt. 9-17, Exhibit A.  The State argued this point to the grand jury before knowing the 
results of the DNA tests. 
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recovered from one or both of the scenes, which was suspected to be from the robber, did 
not come from Price.23 
 Other items suggested a possible connection between Price and at least the Perez 
robbery:  The denim shorts recovered from Price’s room contained cedar fibers, and the 
roof outside Perez’s window had cedar shingles;24 the carpet fibers found on the denim 
shorts recovered from Price’s room were of the same material and colored with the same 
type of dye as those in Perez’s carpet.25  However, Price worked in a recycling facility,26 
and no one at trial was able to exclude the possibility that Price encountered those 
materials on the job (or somewhere other than Perez’s home). 
B. Procedural History 
 In August 2004, in New Jersey Superior Court, Price was tried and convicted of 
burglary, robbery, and a number of other charges related to the Hamer and Perez 
robberies.27  On November 15, 2006, the Superior Court’s Appellate Division affirmed 
all convictions except one not relevant here.  On March 17, 2007, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court denied a petition for certification. 
 On April 23, 2007, Price filed pro se for postconviction relief (PCR) and was 
appointed an attorney.  PCR counsel raised numerous claims, including an ineffective 
                                                 
23 Dkt. 9-17, p. 1.  The State so stipulated because it was required to do so in the 
procedural posture in which it appeared.  Dkt. 10-15, p. 26 (Tr. 48-49).  At a minimum, it 
is not known whether the hair, if tested, would match Price’s. 
24 App. 305-06. 
25 App. 311, 314. 
26 App. 180. 
27 Price was initially tried and convicted in 2001, but his conviction was overturned on 
appeal due to a juror issue not relevant here. 
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assistance of counsel claim based on the failure of defense counsel at trial to challenge 
the chain of custody of the cigarette butt.28  On January 14, 2009, the PCR court denied 
relief.  Price appealed pro se.  On March 8, 2011, the Appellate Division affirmed.29  On 
July 22, 2011, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied a petition for certification. 
 In April 2012, Price filed a pro se federal habeas corpus petition raising several 
claims, which the District Court denied on June 30, 2015.30  On August 25, 2016, this 
Court granted a certificate of appealability “on the issue of whether trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to request suppression or otherwise challenge the chain of custody 
of the cigarette butt that was admitted into evidence.”31 
II. Discussion32 
A. Standard of Review 
 In this case, we directly review the District Court’s opinion, to which we give no 
deference because the District Court did not hold an evidentiary hearing.33  The District 
Court collaterally “review[ed] the ‘last reasoned decision’ of the state courts on the 
                                                 
28 See, e.g., Dkt. 10-15, p. 5 (Tr. 6) (“[The] chain of custody is where to start and no one 
went there.”); Id. p. 9 (Tr. 15) (“[I]n a DNA case, you look at chain of custody.  That’s 
the first place you go.  They didn’t do that.  They didn’t make the argument about chain 
of custody.”); see also Dkt. 9-15, p. 12 (“CIGARETTE BUTT—CHAIN OF 
CUSTODY”). 
29 Dkt. 9-22. 
30 Price v. Warren, No. 12-2238, 2015 WL 3970124 (D.N.J. June 30, 2015). 
31 App. 71. 
32 The District Court had jurisdiction over this habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; 
we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. 
33 Branch v. Sweeney, 758 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Because the District Court did 
not hold an evidentiary hearing and, instead, based its decision on its review of the state 
court record, we apply a plenary standard of review of its decision and order.”) (citing 
Duncan v. Morton, 256 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
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petitioner’s claims.”34  We cannot grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner unless 
the last reasoned state court adjudication:  
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States; or 
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 
proceeding.35 
 
 Here, the District Court correctly determined that the last reasoned state court 
decision was that of the Appellate Division.  In declining to grant the writ, the District 
Court largely relied on the reasoning of the Appellate Division, so we will primarily 
review the Appellate Division’s opinion.36 
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 The claim made in the state courts and renewed here is that defense counsel 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel.37  We review such claims under the standards 
in Strickland v. Washington,38 which has two prongs:  performance and prejudice. 
1. Performance 
 Under Strickland, we first must consider whether “counsel’s representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness.”39  “A convicted defendant making a 
                                                 
34 Robinson v. Beard, 762 F.3d 316, 324 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Simmons v. Beard, 590 
F.3d 223, 231-32 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
35 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
36 The Appellate Division adopted a portion of the PCR court’s reasoning; we will treat 
that portion as part of the Appellate Division’s opinion as well. 
37 Price made numerous other claims in the state courts, but no others are before us. 
38 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
39 Outten v. Kearney, 464 F.3d 401, 414 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687-88). 
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claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are 
alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment.”40  “[A] single, 
serious error may support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel . . ..”41   
 Here, Price argues that defense counsel should have addressed the chain of 
custody of the cigarette butt.  Under New Jersey law, ordinarily “a defect in the chain of 
custody goes to the weight . . . of the evidence introduced.”42  Hence, we consider 
whether counsel should have argued to the jury that the defects in the chain of custody 
here suggest that the cigarette butt should be disregarded as unreliable.43 
 The Appellate Division provided two reasons for holding that counsel’s 
performance was not deficient.  First, the Appellate Division observed the sequence of 
events:  Pierce found the butt, Scull retrieved it, and then Scull and other officers 
searched Price’s room.  From this sequence, the Appellate Division concluded that 
officers could not have planted a butt from Price’s home before Pierce found it; they did 
not have access to Price’s home until afterward.44  Hence, the Appellate Division 
concluded that a chain of custody argument would have been implausible, and counsel 
was not deficient for failing to advance an implausible argument. 
                                                 
40 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  
41 Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 383 (1986).  
42 State v. Morton, 715 A.2d 228, 260 (N.J. 1998) (quoting United States v. Matta-
Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 769 (9th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
43 Price also argues that counsel should have filed a motion to suppress the cigarette butt 
before trial.  Because we decide that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the 
chain of custody during trial, we do not address whether counsel also should have filed a 
motion to suppress before trial. 
44 Dkt. 9-22, p. 4.  
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 However, this analysis depends on a serious error.  The chain of custody refers to 
what happens to evidence after the police retrieve it, not before.  The fact that officers 
could not have planted the cigarette butt before retrieving it has no bearing on whether 
officers mishandled the butt after retrieving it.  The Appellate Division’s apparent 
determination otherwise was an unreasonable determination of fact. 
 Second, the Appellate Division asserted that Price’s defense counsel was not 
deficient because she had “attempted unsuccessfully to discredit the cigarette butt’s chain 
of custody.”45  This, too, was an unreasonable determination of fact.  The Appellate 
Division was referring to defense counsel’s argument that Price might not have left the 
butt on the roof before the robbery; instead, he might have gone to the store under Perez’s 
apartment during the day after the robbery and flipped the cigarette butt onto the roof 
then.46  This is not a chain of custody argument; counsel’s argument referred to what 
happened before Scull retrieved the butt, not after.   
 If we focus on what happened after Pierce gave the butt to Scull, the trial 
transcripts show that Price’s counsel never attempted to discredit the chain of custody of 
the cigarette butt.  To the contrary, she conceded that the cigarette butt that was tested 
was the butt found by Pierce – i.e., that the chain of custody was beyond question.47 This 
concession demonstrates further ineffective assistance of counsel.  The concession 
                                                 
45 Dkt. 9-22, p. 4.   
46 This probably was not possible; Price was at work or under arrest for all or nearly all of 
the relevant period.   
47 See App. 333 (“[Piece] went and got [the cigarette butt] and gave it to Detective Scull. . 
. . We know that ultimately it’s tested.  And that the DNA is linked to, reasonable 
certainty to Alonzo Price.  It was his cigarette.”). 
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negated any possible attack on the chain of custody after Pierce gave the butt to Scull on 
the evening of June 22.  It was, however, during this period that the records of custody 
are lacking.  
 Accordingly, we conclude that the state court’s adjudication of Price’s ineffective 
assistance claim depended on unreasonable determinations of fact.  For this reason, we 
will not defer to it under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA).  When we have so concluded, but our reasons for rejecting AEDPA deference 
do not in themselves decide the merits of the claim, we next consider the claim de novo.48  
Thus, we now must evaluate the performance prong.   
 Clearly, competent counsel would have addressed the chain of custody.  The 
cigarette butt was the single most important piece of evidence for the prosecution,49 and 
the chain of custody was the single greatest weakness in that evidence.  Cigarette butts 
are ubiquitous, almost indistinguishable, and easily substituted one for another by a 
person wishing to do so.  Here, there were considerable irregularities in the 
documentation of the butt.  As a result, defense counsel should argue that Scull (or 
                                                 
48 Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 778 (9th Cir. 2014) (“If we determine, considering only 
the evidence before the state court, that . . . the state court’s decision was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts, we evaluate the claim de novo . . ..”); Siehl v. 
Grace, 561 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[A]ssessing the ineffective assistance claim in 
light of all the circumstances, we conclude that the Superior Court’s application of 
Strickland in this case was not objectively reasonable and that the District Court was 
entitled to review the record de novo.”). 
49 The prosecution placed considerable emphasis on the cigarette butt throughout the trial, 
including opening and closing arguments.  See Dkt. 10-6, p. 37 (presenting the cigarette 
butt as the penultimate piece of evidence in opening argument and described it as 
establishing “[b]eyond a shadow of a doubt” that Price committed the Perez robbery.); 
App. 336 (ending closing argument by discussing the cigarette butt). 
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another officer) may have had the butt from Perez’s apartment in his possession when the 
officers found many similar butts in Price’s room and should have explored whether any 
of the officers present, intentionally or unintentionally, switched one butt for another.  
Under these circumstances, defense counsel’s failure to challenge the chain of custody 
was an inexcusable failure on the part of that attorney.  Moreover, to concede that the butt 
tested at the lab was the same butt found on the roof was an even greater demonstration 
of ineffectiveness.   
 As the New Jersey courts have held:  “[W]here the incriminating object has passed 
out of the possession of the original receiver and into the possession of others, the ‘chain 
of possession’ must be established to avoid any inference that there has been substitution 
or tampering.”50  We can find no rational reason here why an effective attorney would 
not challenge the custody of the cigarette butt between the time when Pierce gave it to 
Scull and the time when it was produced in the courtroom. 
 2. Prejudice  
 Under Strickland, we next ask whether “the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense.”51  Prejudice is established when “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
                                                 
50 State v. Brown, 238 A.2d 482, 484-84 (N.J. Super. 1968) (citing State v. Johnson, 216 F.2d 
397 (N.J.Super 1965) affirmed 216 A.2d 392 (N.J. 1966)).  
51 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
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outcome.”52  The Appellate Division did not address prejudice, so we consider prejudice 
without any deference.53 
 We believe that there is a reasonable probability that, had a chain of custody 
challenge been made, the jury would have harbored reasonable doubt about the cigarette 
butt:  Why wasn’t it logged in as were the other exhibits?  Did a police officer, 
deliberately or not, substitute it for one of the butts from the ash tray in Price’s room?  
Did that police officer want to nail Price for the robbery, particularly in view of the 
conflicting nature of the evidence that the police were gathering?  A jury presented with 
such doubt about the cigarette butt may not have voted to convict.  Also, if the jury chose 
to disregard the butt due to the defects in its chain of custody, the remaining evidence 
was mixed:  for example, the physical description of the suspect that didn’t match Price, 
the questions about the voice identification, the discrepancy in the size of the scissors, the 
red fibers that didn’t match anything at either victim’s residence, the torn strips of pillow 
shams that contained someone else’s DNA, the recovered hair that wasn’t Price’s.  This 
may well have created reasonable doubt in the mind of a juror.  If the jury began to doubt 
police procedures regarding the cigarette butt, they might have become concerned about 
the other pieces of evidence.54  In these circumstances, we are not confident in the 
outcome of this trial; there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failure to 
                                                 
52 Id. at 694. 
53 Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 
390 (2005). 
54 See Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 256 (3d Cir. 2004) (describing the falsus in 
uno, falsus in omnibus principle, which permits a jury to disregard part or all of a 
witness’s testimony if the witness has testified falsely about a material fact). 
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challenge the chain of custody of the cigarette butt, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different. 
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that counsel was ineffective and that Price 
was prejudiced thereby.  We will reverse the judgment of the District Court and direct 
that the writ of habeas corpus be granted.  The State must release Price or grant him a 
new trial within six months of the date of the judgment accompanying this opinion. 
